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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL F'ARMERS UNION 
PROPERTY AND· C:AS.UALTY C·O., 
a ·corporation, 
Plaintiff arn'd Appellant, 
-vs.-
~ELAND· J. THOMPSON, 
D-efendant and R.esp·ondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF' 
Case No. 8286 
NAT·URE OF THE CASE 
This action arose under a fire insurance policy issued 
by the plaintiff co;vering certain property located on a 
tract of land in Box Elder County, Utah. The insurance 
was intended to cover a frame dwelling, used as a garage, 
for $2,000; an Allis Chalmers tractor for $2,000; and an 
.Allis Chalmers combine for $2,000. (Exhibit P-3). The 
premium for the p·olicy was $23.00 and the insurance was 
to run from October 26, 1951, to October 26, 1952. 
On or about the 26th day of October, 1952, the de-
fendant renewed the policy for the period from October 
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26, 1952, to October 26, 1953. On November 8, 1952, the 
foregoing property was destroyed in a fire (R. 1-6). On 
the 21st day of January, 1953, pursuant to a proof of loss 
filed by the defendant (Exhibit P-2 and D-14 and 15), 
the plaintiff paid to the defendant the sum of $2,000, 
which was represented to be the value of the frame build-
ing. There was some question concerning the identity 
of the· Allis Chalmers tractor and combine and no pay-
ment was made for these items at that time (Tr. 88-89). 
During the course of the investigation concerning 
the identity of the combine and tractor, it was discovered 
that the defendant had sold the frame building prior to 
the date of the fire, which sale the company had not been 
informed of at the time the $2,000 was p-aid (R. 89-90). 
It was further discovered that at the time the insurance 
was originally p·rocured the defendant was not the owner 
of the building and had certain encumbrances upon the 
other prop·erty of which he had not advised the company. 
IThe plaintiff thereupon brought an action against 
the defendant to cancel the policy of insurance and tore-
cover the $2,000 which had been paid (R. 1-3). The de-
fendant answered and counterclaimed for the damage to 
the tractor and combine '(R. 6-9). The case was tried to 
a jury and submitted to them on special interrogatories. 
On the basis of their answers to the interrogatories, 
the court entered judgment for the defendant for the 
damage to the tractor and combine plus interest (R. 72). 
As. part of its judgment, the court entered a judg-
ment of no cause of action on plaintiff's complaint (R. 
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72), but specifically found that the value of the frame 
building at the time of the fire was $1,000. The court 
thereupon entered an additional order granting a new 
trial on the plaintiff's complaint unless the defendant 
should file his consent that the judgment on the counter-
claim should be reduced $1,000, the consent to be filed 
within ten days or by 5:00 P.·M. on April23, 19·54 (R. 73). 
The defendant did not file his consent, and on Ap·ril 
23, 1954, the court ordered a new trial as to plaintiff's 
complaint, it appearing to the court: 
"* * * That said defendant obtained $2,000 as 
insurance from plaintiff on the representation 
that the building was worth the sum of $2,000, at 
the time of said fire when in truth and in fact 
said building was only worth the sum of $1,000 
at that time·; and it further appearing that this 
court, after making a finding to the effect that 
said building was only worth $1,000 at the time of 
the fire, erred by not entering a judgment that 
plaintiff recover the sum of $1,000 on its com-
plaint, and it further appearing that the court 
committed errors at law in the foregoing respects 
and that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the judgment, as entered, and other good cause 
being shown," (R. 76). 
Subsequently various motions were filed by the par-
ties, and on October 13, 1954, the court entered an order 
amending the findings by striking the finding "that the 
value of the building at the time of the fire was One 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($1,000.00) only." The 
court further vacated its order for a new trial. In its 
reply to the counterclaim of the· defendant, the plaintiff 
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had admitted that the frame building had a value of 
$2.,000. The court gave as one of its reasons for setting 
aside the order for a new trial and amending the findings 
that: 
"The court did not have in mind the fact that 
the parties, by their pleadings, had stipulated to 
the value of said structure." 
The questions presented by this appeal are then: Did 
defendant have an insura;ble interest in the· frame build-
ing at the time of the fire~ Was the policy of insurance 
void b·y reason of defendant's misrep·resentation as to his 
ownership· of the building and his interest in the combine 
and tractor~ When the evidence showed that the frame 
building had a value of $1,000, could the court enter a 
finding to that effect~ And did the court, having entered 
an order granting a new trial, err in vacating that order 
some months later~ 
'STATE·MENT' OF F AC:TS 
It would appear that the facts can best be presented 
by covering them in a chronological order. 
On September 30, 1947, the defendant acquired the 
frame building described in the insurance policy under a 
"Vete-ran Farm Labor Housing Contract" wherein the 
Box Elder County Farm Labor Association leased the 
building to Leland J. ·Thompson for a consideration of 
$225.00 and $20.00 for the fixtures. The Association 
was to move the building onto the defendant's farm and 
the defendant leased to the Association a plot of ground 
on which the building was to be placed (Exhibit D-4, Tr. 
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15). On October 26, 1951, the defendant applied to the 
plaintiff for a fire insurance policy on the frame dwell-
ing, the tractor, and the combine. The application for 
the insurance was taken by a Nick H. Topik, who testified 
that the application contained all the information given 
to him by Mr. Thompson (Tr. 74-75). An examination 
of the application, Exhibit D-10, reveals that Leland 
Thompson was represented to be the owner of the 
frame dwelling, the tractor and the com'bine. As has been 
pointed out previously, Leland Thompson did not own 
the frame dwelling at the time, but it was leased from the 
Box Elder County Farm Association. Moreover, the de-
fendant had a loan on the tractor from the F:arm Home 
Administration, the original amount of which was $2,500, 
of which nothing had been said to the agent (Tr. 74-75), 
and which did not appear in the application for the fire 
insurance policy (Exhibit D-10). 
The plaintiff issued a fire insurance policy covering 
the above described ·building and items of equipment 
showing Leland J. Thompson as the insured, and not 
showing any encumbrances on the building or the other 
items of equipment (Exhibit P -3). The term of the policy 
was from October 26, 19·51, to October 26, 1952. The 
policy insured each of the items for $2,000 and contained 
the provision that the company "does insure: Leland 
J. 'Thompson and legal representatives, to the ext,ent of 
the actual cash value of the property at the time of loss." 
The policy contained the further provisions: 
''The entire policy shall be void if, whether 
before or after a loss, the insured has wilfully 
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c?ncealed or n1isrepresented any material fact or 
Circumstance concerning this insurance or the 
subject thereof, or the interest of the insured 
therein, or in case of any fraud or false swearing 
by the insured relating thereto." 
And 
''The insured shall give immediate written 
notice to this Company of any loss, protect the 
property from further damage, forthwith separate 
the damaged and undamaged personal property, 
put it to the best possible order, furnish a com-
plete inventory of the destroyed damaged and 
undamaged property, showing in detail quanti-
ties, cost, actual cash value and the amount of 
loss claimed; and within sixty days after the loss, 
* * * the insured shall render to this Company 
a proff of loss, signed and sworn to by the in-
sured, stating the knowledge and belief of the 
insured as to the following: The time and origin 
of loss, the interest of the insured and all others 
in the p,roperty, the actual cash value of each 
item thereof and the amount of loss thereto, all 
encumbrances thereon, all other contracts of in-
surance, whether valid or not, covering any of 
the property, any changes in the title, use, oc-
cupation, location, possession or exp.osures of 
said property since the issuing of this policy." 
·On December 8, 1951, the defendant sold the real 
property on which the frame building in question was 
located to John M. Hardy and his wife. (Tr. 17). As to 
whether the building was to be part of the sale, defendant 
testified starting on page 23 of the transcript: 
"Q. I said did you sell the barracks building 
which was burned in the fire to Mr. Hardy along 
with the land on D·ecember 18, 1951? 
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"A. The house was to go along with the 
deal, but Mr. Hardy understood that the title 
wasn't clear on the building and was to be turned 
over to him at the time it was cleared up with the 
Labor Association of Box Elder County. 
* * * * * 
"Q. You sold your interest in the building to 
Mr. Hardy at the time you sold the land, didn't 
you~ 
"A. How could I sell it to him until the time 
I got the deeds to it~ 
"Q. Well, you sold him what part you owned 
in it, if anything. Did you own anything in the 
building at that time~ 
"A. I didn't own only my interest in it. 
''Q. Did you sell Mr. Hardy your interest at 
that time, Mr. Thompson~ 
''A. The only thing I'll sa.y is that it was to 
go along with the deal. 
"Q. By that do you mean when it was to go 
along, that Mr. Hardy was to acquire your interest 
in the deal; is that what you mean~ 
"A. He was to acquire the building along 
with the land." 
On that same point, Mr. J'ohn M. Hardy testified on 
page 140 of the transcript : 
"Q. Where and when was this barracks 
building discussed between you as to its being 
concerned in the deal~ 
"A. Well, at the time we were dealing on the 
place. 
"Q. Now, what was said with respect to this 
barracks building~ 
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"A. Well, I had an option of buying it with 
or without the barracks on. 
"MR. HANSON: Bying the land with or 
without; is that what you mean~ 
"A. Buying the land with or without the 
barracks on it, and we done quite a bit of cor-
responding on that. 
"Q. And when the deal was finally con-
summated, did you take it with or without~ 
"A. I was to get the building with the place. 
"Q. How did you pay for the place~ 
"'A. I assumed a mortgage on it and paid 
Mr. Thompson for his equity." 
As to the price paid for the building, the defendant 
testified on p·age 47 of the transcript: 
"Q. * * * Now, taking you back again to the 
time that you had the negotiations with Mr. Hardy 
about the sale of the prop·erty or the land, did 
·Mr. Hardy pay you anything additional for the 
building other than your equity in the land~ 
"A. He paid me the price that we agreed on 
the whole thing. 
'' Q. Well, just tell me what it was. Did he 
pay you anything additional for the building over 
and above the p·rice of the land, and if so how 
much~ 
''A. If he hadn't taken the building there 
was sup·posed to be a thousand dollars less. 
"Q. In other words, he paid you a thousand 
dollars for the building; isn't that right~ 
"A. He paid me a thousand dollars for it 
with the building on, yes." 
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At the time the frame building was sold, Mr. Hardy 
gave Mr. Thompson permission to use the building. ·On 
that point Mr. Hardy testified beginning on page 140 of 
the transcript: 
Q. Now, then, was anything said about Mr. 
Thompson's use of that barracks building~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. What~ 
·"A. He had his machinery there, and he 
wanted to use the barracks until he could get his 
machinery-he was talking at that time of getting 
another place and to move it up there. I told him 
it was all right, because I had no occasion to use 
the building at that time. 
'' Q. And that was before the deal was con-
summated; is that right? 
"A. That's right." 
On page 143 of the transcript, Mr. Hardy testified: 
''Q. Now, after you had taken possession of 
the rest of the place, did Mr. Thompson talk to 
you any further about holding onto this barracks 
'building longer, or otherwise about it? 
"A. Yes, he did. 
"Q. Was there any further discussion about 
that before you closed the deal? 
"A. Well, right at the time we were talking 
about it, and he said he wanted possession. I said 
I had no occasion to use the building, it was all 
right at that time for him to go on and use it until 
he could move the machinery. 
"Q. And it was there after you told him that 
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was all right for hin1 to continue to use it there; 
was there anything further said at the time you 
closed the deal~ 
"A. Not at that time. 
"Q. That was the entire deal with respect to 
the building at that time~ 
"A. As I remember it. I had no occasion to 
use the building, and he wanted to use it, and it 
was p·erfectly all right with me at that time when 
we were talking about the deal." 
On cross-examination, Mr. Hardy was asked at page 
146 of the transcript : 
"Q. If you wanted to make any use of 
the building other than putting machinery where 
Mr. Thompson had his, you would have done so, 
wouldn't you~ 
so~ 
"A. Well, as I ~stated, I had no_ occasion to. 
"Q. If you had occasion, you would have done 
"A. Yes, but I don't-
" Q. If you had had any reason, for instance, 
to put some hand tools or to store something in 
the p~art of the building not occupied by the ma-
chinery, you would have gone down and done it, 
wouldn't you~ 
''A. I suppose anybody would have done that. 
"Q. You were just allowing Mr. Thompson 
to keep the machinery in there rmtil it was sold? 
"Q. Isn't that so' 
''A. 'That's how farmers works. S-ure it is." 
10 
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On the question of whether anything was paid for 
the privilege of storing the equipment in the building, 
the defendant told John P. Gatfield, the person who in-
vestigated this loss, that there was nothing said between 
Mr. Thompson and Mr. Hardy in respect to any rental 
or any kind of a charge for this convenience. On or about 
October 15, 1952, after the defendant had sold the build-
ing, the defendant mailed a check for $19.60 (Exhibit 
D-7) to the Company with a renewal premium receipt 
extending the coverage afforded by the policy to October 
26, 1953 (R. 41). At the same time, the defendant claims 
that he mailed a letter (Exhibit D-6) informing the Com-
pany that he had sold the building. 
Milo M. Jensen, claims manager for the plaintiff, 
testified that he had examined the file on Mr. Thompson's 
insurance policy and that he did not find any letters or 
letter like Exhibit D-6 in the file; that the Company did 
not know that the building had 'been sold to Mr. Hardy 
until the summer of 1953 when they got a report to that 
effect from the adjusting firm in Salt Lake City telling 
the Company that they had just learned that Mr. Thomp-
son was not the owner of the building (R. 53). Mr. Jensen 
testified further that it was the practice of his Company 
upon receiving such a notice to contact the owner and 
have him execute an assignment of the policy to the new 
owner (P-16). 
On November 8, 1952, the fire occured in which the 
property concerned was either totally destroyed or 
damaged. 
11 
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John P. Gatfield testified that he was employed by 
the ·scott Wetzel Comp·any of Salt Lake City as an in-
surance adjuster and that he investigated this fire loss 
( Tr. 88). He testified that in the course of his investiga-
tion, he had difficulty in correlating the numbers on the 
equip·ment with the serial and motor numbers on the in-
surance policy, but that the claim for the loss of the 
building itself was paid at the insistance of Mr. Topik 
and Mr. Thomp'son (R. 189). He firs~t learned of 
the sale of the frame building about two or three weeks 
after the insurance company had issued their draft for 
$2,000 through another insurance comp·any in the course 
of their investigation, the other insurance company hav-
ing had insurance on a. Mack truck which was stored in 
the building. He then arranged for an interview with 
Mr. Thompson, in which Mr. Thompson told him that he 
had sold his farm and that the building had 'been include'd 
in the sale (Tr. 90). At that time Mr. Thompson never 
mentioned anything about having given notice to the 
company of the sale of the ·building (Tr. 91). On January 
31, 1953, Leland Thompson received the bill of sale to 
the frame dwelling from the Box Elder Farm Labor 
Association (Exhibit D-5). On July 31, 1953, the plain-
tiff started its action to recover the $2,000 paid for the 
frame building and ·at the beginning of the trial tendered 
to the defendant the return of the insurance policy pre-
mium paid as a renewal of the policy from October 26, 
1952, to October 26, 1953 ( Tr. 1). 
12 
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STATEMEN'T OF: POINTS 
POINT I. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN 
INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE FRAME DWELLING AT 
THE TIME THE INSURANCE POLICY WAS RENEWED OR 
THE LOSS OCCURRED. 
POINT II. ASSUMING DEFENDANT DID HAVE AN 
INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE FRAME BUILDING, THE 
LIMIT OF HIS RE.COVERY FOR THE LOSS THEREOF IS 
THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE FRAME BUILDING. 
POINT III. THE INSURANCE POLICY WAS VOID BY 
REASON OF DEFENDANT'S MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN VACATING ITS 
ORDER FOR A NEW TRIAL ON PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN 
INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE FRAME DWELLING AT 
THE TIME THE INSURANCE POLICY WAS RENEWED OR 
THE LOSS OCCURRED. 
The applicable Utah Statute, Section 31-19-4, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
" ( 1) No contract of insurance on property or 
on any interest therein or arising therefrom, shall 
be enforcible except for the benefit of persons 
having an insurable interest in the things in-
sured. 
"(2) 'Insurable interest' as used in this Sec-
tion means any lawful and substantial economic 
interest in the safety or preservation of the sub-
ject of the insurance free from loss, destruction 
or pecuniary damage." 
We have not been able to find a decision where the 
13 
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courts have construed the words "substantial economic 
' interest". 
That an insured must have an insurable interest at 
the time he takes out a contract of insurance and at the 
time of loss is basic. Otherwise, 'the contract, rather than 
.being an agreement to indemnify the insured for any 
loss he might suffer, becomes a mere gambling contract 
wherein the assured stands to gain upon the happening 
of a certain event. As is said in Volume 4 of Applemwn's 
Insurance Law and Practic;e, at page 99·: 
"The insured must be the owner of the prO-
perty at the time he takes out the insurance and at 
the time of loss, by the majority rule, and how-
ever defective such allegations of interest may be, 
they must be proved. Nor can the character of 
the insured's interest be changed between the date. 
of insurance and the date of loss without the 
'Consent of the insurer. 
"A fire contract, or other property insurance, 
is considered a personal contract in that the haz-
ards which the comp·any elects to assume are 
hazards concerned with the contracting individual 
-his character, moral qualities, and the like-the 
insurance running to the individual rather than 
upon the property. If the insured, then, parts 
with an interest in the property prior to loss, it 
is not covered. It is not necessary to have a 
specific by-laws to the effect that a transfer or 
sale of the property avoids p·rotection; a sale by 
the insured between the date of the policy and 
the date of the loss is considered to avoid protec-
tion." 
As we have seen from the evidence· the defendant, 
14 
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Leland J. Thompson, conveyed his entire interest in the 
frame dwelling, which was the subject of the insurance 
policy in this case, to J'ohn M. Hardy. The most that 
can be said was that Leland Thompson had permission 
from Mr. Hardy to keep his equipment in Mr. Hardy's 
building, which permission could have been withdrawn 
at any time. No consideration was paid for the privilege. 
Did the mere privilege or license to store the ma-
chinery in the building constitute a" substantial economic 
interest," when it was revokable at any time by the owner 
of the building~ Of course, the argument will be made 
that Leland J. Thompson was the bailee or had posses-
sion of the building. This, however, is not borne out by 
the evidence which shows that the land on which the 
building was located and the building itself had been 
conveyed to John M. Hardy and was completely within 
his possession and control. This is further borne out by 
the fact that the defendant considered it necessary to 
secure Mr. Hardy's permission to keep the equipment in 
the building, and further the evidence shows that Mr. 
Hardy was free to use the building and to store his own 
tools and machinery therein. 
In Fidelity & Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. 
Raper, 6 So. ( 2d) 513 (Ala.) a sublessee erected a build-
ing on land without the permission of the lessor. There 
was no permission relative to placing improvements on 
the land. The court held that the building became the 
property of the original lessor and the person who 
bought the building from the sublessee had no insurable 
interest. The court said: 
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"On these uncontradicted facts, plaintiff, if 
he had an interest at all, is merely a trespasser 
o: tenant by sufferance; that is to say, the· plain-
tiff had no right which he could enforce so far as 
the building was concerned and he could have 
been arrested at any time. He did not even have 
the right of p·ossession except as a squatter or 
trespasser would have. 
"The law is clear that a person with no inter-
est in land other than that of a tenant by 'Suf-
ferance, or trespasser, has no insurable interest in 
the property." 
In IG.anefsky v. National Commercial Mutual Fire 
Ins. Co., 35 Atl (2d) 766 (Penn.), where a person was in 
possession of prop·erty under an unenforcible parol con-
tract to convey the property to him, the "unconditional 
and sole ownership'' of the policy in said 
"Insura'ble interest in property imparts an 
interest which can be enforced at law or in equity." 
In Pric,e v. United Pacific Casualty Co., 56 Pac~ (2d) 
116, (Ore.), under a burglary policy providing that in-
surance should ap·ply to all property owned by husband 
or any p·ermanent member of his household, the husband 
was held without an insurable interest in a diamond ring, 
and hence not entitled to maintain an action on the policy 
for theft of the ring for his own benefit. ·Says the court: 
Insurable interest in property is created only 
through ownership, rightful possession, acquisi-
tion of lien, or in a similar manner, and cannot 
be created through contract between insured and 
insurer, since such contract would be a mere 
wagery agreement." 
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Holm.e.s v. Grange Fr,at.ern.al Fire Insura.nc.e Asso-
ciation, 228, Pac. ( 2d) 889· (Cal.), held : 
''Where fire insurance policy issued by de-
fendant Fraternal Fire Insurance Association was 
issued to plaintiff's hus·band on realty which he 
contracted to purchase prior to his marriage, the 
fact that property constituted wife's home at the 
time the policy was issued and that she filed a 
declaration of homestead gave her no title or in-
surable interest in property." 
Sweeny v. Franklin Fire Insurance Company, 20 
Pa. 337, (Penn.) held: 
"One who was a stockholder and a creditor 
of an unincorporated company which erected a 
house on land belonging to the ·state of Delaware, 
without license or shadow of title from the State, 
had no insurable interest in the house, though he 
claimed by relinquishment and transfer from 
most of the stockholders to the creditors and was 
in possession at the time of effecting the insurance 
and at the time of the destruction of the premises. 
"The rule is valuable and well-founded that 
he who has no interest can have no insurance. 
That he must show his interest and that is the ex-
treme measure of his recovery are correlaries of 
the rule, without this, insurance would soon be-
come a mere system of gambling. These principles 
are sufficient to affirm the judgment." 
In Baldwin v. State Insurance Company, 15 N. W. 
300 (Iowa), a son took a policy of insurance on property 
belonging to his father with a view to prevent creditors 
of his father from garnishing the fund in case of loss. 
Said the court: 
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"We come then, to inquire whether W. E. 
Baldwin, son, can recover. He certainly cannot 
recover for his own benefit. It is conceded he did 
not suffer by the loss and has no beneficial inter-
est in the policy. Can he recover for the benefit 
of E. T. Baldwin (father)! To this proposition 
we think it sufficient to say that the policy by 
express terms limits the rights of recovery there-
under toW. E. Baldwin's interest in the proper-
ty." 
In Davis v. Bremer County Farmers Mutual Fire 
Insur·anc:e Association, (Iowa) 134 N. W. 860, a policy 
was issued May 22, 1908, to Mrs. William Blume, cover-
ing her dwelling house and farm buildings. On October 
26, 1908, she sold the p-roperty to the plaintiff Davis, 
and on November 13, 1908, she executed an assignment of 
said policy to him, which assignment was consented to 
by endorsement thereon by the secretary of the company. 
On November 9, 1908, four days prior to the assignment, 
the assured's p-roperty was destroyed by fire. The court 
said: 
"* * * The three elementary principles of fire 
insurance which, working together, ·bring about 
this inevitable result are, first, that a policy of 
fire insurance is a contract of indemnity, and if, at 
the time of the loss, the holder of the policy has 
no right, title or interest to, or in the property in-
sured, he cannot recover anything under his con-
tract of insurance, where the damage to or de-
struction of the property results in no injury to 
him; second, that the purchaser of the property, 
taking it prior to the loss, is not a party to any 
contract of insurance between the former owner 
and the insurer, and therefore is not entitled to 
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reeover under the con tract ; and, third, that the 
contract of fire insurance, being personal in na-
ture, cannot be transferred by the insured to an-
other, save in accordance with the provisions of 
the contract itself, involving the express or im-
plied assent of the insurer, or a valid contract 
of the insurer that it shall become liable to the 
new owner. These elementary propositions are 
not dependent on any stipulation, conditions or 
limitations of the contract itself, but result from 
the very nature of the contract, though, of course 
they may be superseded or waived by the provi-
sions in the contract, or by a new valid contract 
or agreement subsequently made. 
* * * * 
"The invalidity of the policy after the at-
tempted transfer thereof by Mrs. Blume to the 
plaintiff in connection with the conveyance of the 
property was not the result of any forfeiture on 
account of conditions subsequent, the contract of 
insurance came to an end because the subject mat-
ter of the contract-that is, the insurable interest 
of Mrs. Blume-had ceased to exist. * * *" 
Thus it is seen that the plaintiff as a matter of law 
was entitled to recover the $2,000 it had paid to the de-
fendant by reason of the destruction of the frame dwell-
ing. This is true regardless of any misrepresentation 
on the part of Mr. Thompson, which we will discuss later, 
and regardless of whether he notified the company, as he 
claims, of the sale of the building. It is brought about 
by the simple proposition that he had transferred any 
interest he owned in the building to Mr. Hardy prior 
to the date of the fire and, therefore, at the time of the 
fire suffered no loss. 
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POINT II. ASSUMING DEFENDANT DID HAVE AN 
INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE FRAME BUILDING, THE 
LIMIT OF HIS RE·COVERY FOR THE LOSS THEREOF IS 
THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE FRAME BUILDING. 
Presupposing, for the purposes of discussion, that 
the defendant did have an insurable interest in the frame 
building, it is submitted that the limit of his recovery 
for the loss is the actual value of the building. On this 
point the defendant testified that he sold the land to Mr. 
Hardy, who had the option of taking the land with or 
without the building, and that he wanted $1,000 for the 
building. It is also the testimony of John M. Hardy that 
he p,aid the defendant $1,000 for the building. 
It is true that in paragraph two of its reply to de-
fendant's counterclaim, plaintiff admitted the value of 
defendant's building was $2,000. However, in paragraph 
four of the reply, it was alleged that the $2,000 was paid 
out on the basis of a proof of loss submitted 'by the de-
fendant. The whole theory of the plaintiff's complaint 
was that defendant had misrepresented his interest in the 
building and was not entitled to the $2,000, he had re-
ceived. The court did find that the defendant had mis-
represented the value of the building in the proof of loss 
and that the value of the building was $1,000, and that 
the defendant was entitled to only $1,000 of the $2,000 he 
had received from the plaintiff for the destruction of the 
building. 
Viewed as a whole, it ap·pears that the defendant's 
interest in the building and whether or not he was en-
titled to received the $2,000, was an issue in the law suit 
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and therefore that the finding that he was entitled to 
receive only $1,000 was within the issues raised by the 
plaintiff. 
Even were this not the case, it appears that the issue 
as to the value of the building was tried without o·bjection 
and by the express or implied consent of the parties, 
and that this issue was therefore before the court even 
though not alleged in the pleadings. Rule 1'5 (b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Proc;edur.e provides: 
"When issues not raised 'by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the par-
ties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings. s.uch amend-
ment of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform with the evidence and to 
raise the issues may be made, upon motion of any 
party at any time, even after judgment; but fail-
ure to so amend does not effect the results of the 
trial of these issues. Where evidence is objected 
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within 
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the pres-
entation of the merits of the action will be sub-
served thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such evi-
dence would prejudice him in making his action 
or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant 
a continuance, if necess~ry, to enable the object-
ing party to meet such evidence." 
In this case, since the evidence carne from the de-
fendant's own witnesses, it is difficult to see how he 
would have been prejudiced by the evidence. Moreover, 
no objection was made to the admission of this evidence 
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and no request for any continuance was made. 
In discussing Rule 15 (b) of the Federal Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, which is the ·same as Rule 15 
(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Baro-n and 
Holtzoff in their book on Federal Prac·tice arn.d Proced-
ure, Vol. 1, at page 914, have this to say: 
"Rule 15 (b) sanctions amendments to con-
form to the proof (1) when issues not pleaded 
are tried by consent, expreS's or implied, and (2) 
when evidence is objected to as not within the is-
sues made by the pleadings, but the presentation 
of the merits will be aided and the opposing party 
not prejudiced by the amendment. * * * 
''A motion to amend to conform to proof may 
be made and granted at any time after presenta-
tion of the evidence has begun, and is frequently 
allowed during the course of trial after the close 
of testimony, and even after return of verdict, or 
entry of judgment, or ap·peal or after remand. 
* * * 
"Amendments to conform to the p·roof are 
permitted in order to bring the pleadings into 
line with the issues actually developed at the trial 
even though the issues were not adequately pre-
sented by the pleadings as originally drawn. Is-
sues not raised by the pleadings which are tried 
by the express or implied consent of the parties, 
are treated in all respects as if raised in the ori-
ginal pleadings. A party impliedly consents to 
the introduction of issues not raised in the plead-
ing by failure to object to the admission of evi-
dence relating thereto, unless he is not repre-
sented by counsel. * * * 
"In accordance with the liberal policy ex-
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pressed in subdivision (b) the courts have exer-
cised wise discretion in allowing amendments to 
conform to pToof, even to the extent of permitting 
recovery on a different theory of liability than 
that on which the case was tried. In some cases 
amendments have been allowed to set up new is-
sues, interpose new defenses, or conform the 
pleadings to the verdict of the jury. 
"The right to amend to conform to proof is 
necessarily dependent upon the individual facts 
and circumstances, and the action of the court in 
granting or denying such leave is not subject to 
review except for abuse of discretion. Because of 
the fact that an action may be finally disposed of 
on a motion for summary judgment, if facts ap-
pear in an affidavit in support of thereof which 
would justify amendment of the complaint, it has 
been held that there may be grounds for treating 
the complaint as though it were already amended 
to conform to such facts. Formal amendment of 
the pleadings is not always necessary as the court 
may, if the evidence so warrants, consider them as 
amended to conform thereto, and failure to file 
amended pleadings subsequently does not affect 
the result of the trial of issues consented to by 
the parties. * * *" 
As was said in Winrn v. Romney, 63 Utah 120, 222 
Pac. 709: 
"There is one other point of more or less sig-
nificance vigorously urged by the plaintiffs. In 
his original answer to plaintiff's complaint filed 
September 25, 1922, three months before the trial, 
defendant denied the existence of any trust what-
ever. This point is relied on as indicating the dis-
ingenuousness of defendant concerning the trust 
alleged in his amended answer filed a few days 
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before the trial. If this were the only point in the 
case, the court would not be inclined to regard it 
as of controlling importance. Pleadings are us-
ually framed by attorneys, and clients ordinarily, 
though sometimes imprudently, attach their sig-
natures to pleadings proposed by their counsel 
without careful scrutiny as to their actual con-
tents. Besides this, eounsel oftentimes, especially 
in the early pleadings of a case, misconceive the 
real cause of action or defense and p·erhaps desire 
to raise some technical questions, on its facts in-
compatible with the actual fact. For these reasons, 
it would be unfair to always treat the statements 
or denials in a pleading as binding admissions 
when offered as evidence in the case." 
The trial judge, after hearing all the evidence in the 
case, was convinced as a matter of law that the. value of 
the building was $1,000. Not wanting to invade the prov-
ince of the jury and to substitute its opinion for that 
of the jury, the court granted a new trial on plaintiff's 
complaint unless the defendant should consent to a re-
duction of his judgment by $1,000. This was. a valid 
exercise of the court's power to order a new trial on 
the ground that the verdict was excessive. As has been 
seen from an examination of the pleadings and orders in 
the case, he later set aside the order for a new trial under 
the misconception that he was bound by the plaintiff's 
admission in his reply that the value of the building was 
$2,000. As has been seen, his first action was correct. 
What the defendant is now attempting to do is 
recover $2,000 for a building admittedly worth only $1,-
000 because of what, at the most, is only a technical defect 
in the pleadings. Granting for the purpose of this point 
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only, that defendant had an insurable interest, justice 
requires a decree that the finding that the building was 
only worth $1,000 and that the plaintiff is therefore en-
titled to recover $1,000 of the $2,000 already paid, he rein-
stated. 
POINT III. THE INSURANCE POLICY WAS VOID BY 
REASON OF DEFENDANT'S MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
It appears from the evidence in this case that the 
defendant, Leland Thompson, was guilty of misrepre-
sentation in at least four respects: First, he· failed to 
reveal the true ownership of the frame building or the 
encumbrance on the tractor at the time he applied for the 
insurance; ;Second, he failed to notify the company of 
the transfer o.f his interest in the frame building to John 
M. Hardy at the time the building was sold; Third, he 
misrepresented the value of the building in the proof 
of loss to be $2,000 and accepted the $2,000 check in pay-
ment for the same when according to his own testimony 
he had sold the building for $1,000 some months earlier; 
and Fourth, after the loss he misrepresented his interest 
in the building both to the insurance adjuster and in the 
formal proof of loss by concealing the fact that he had 
sold the building some months prior to the actual loss. 
The requirement that an insured disclose his interest 
in the insured property is vital. As has been said in 
Appleman in his work on Insurance Law and Practice, 
Volume 4, beginning on page 298: 
"If the insured has failed to disclose his title, 
as required by a condition of the policy, or has 
disclosed a false title, he cannot recover on the 
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contract. The policy condition renders the con-
tract void for failure to make such a disclosure, 
it amounting to a concealment of a material fact. 
And this is true though such failure was uninten-
tional. A few cases, however, hold that unless 
fraud was p:racticed, failure to disclose will not 
affect the validity of the con tract. 
"Even though no representation was made by 
the insured, he ha.s been held to he under a duty 
to see that all warranties are in prop·er form, and 
even though the insurer may not have inquired in-
to the state of the title or the insured may have 
made no statement relevant thereto, a policy 
clause stating that the contract shall be void if 
the insured's interest is less than sole or uncon-
ditional ownership, controls. Many states have 
held that by merely accepting a policy with such 
a provision contained therein, the insured war-
rants the truth thereof. There have been holdings 
to the contrary, however, particularly where the 
insured is shown to have been ignorant of the 
p-olicy conditions. 
''Where the insured p~urports to state the 
facts concerning title or ownership, he must state 
them correctly, and any definite false statements 
made relevant thereto or any positive misrepre-
sentations, will avoid protection under the policy. 
This is, of course, particularly true where the 
misre-presentation was made with actual intent to 
deceive, or it increased the risk of loss, but it ha.s 
been stated that representation that the insured's 
title is by deed does not imply that such owner-
ship is perfect and unconditional. 
"Where either a misrepresentation or con-
cealment ap·pears as to the sole and unconditional 
ownership provision, or as to title generally, the 
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1najority of courts have held good faith or lack of 
knowledge to be of no defense. Even lack of knowl-
edge of such condition, or regarding it as non-
essential, would not relieve the insured under 
that rule. A few courts have held to the contrary 
where no intent to deceive appeared, and the fail-
ure was not intentional and fraudulent. 
"The reason for the adopting of such strin-
gent rules by the majority of courts is that the 
representation is considered highly material to the 
risk.'' 
Much of the evidence of the defendant went to the 
question of whether or not the misrepresentation of the 
defendant was made in good faith. Whether the mis-
representation was made in good faith or not, the fact 
that a misrepresentation was made avoids the policy. 
As stated in 29 Am. Jur. on Insurance. at 425: 
"The general rule is that in the absence of 
statute, the fact that a misrepresentation was 
made in good faith, or as a result of inadvertence, 
mistake, negligence or ignorance, will not pre-
clude it from being deemed material and a cause 
for the avoidance of the policy procured in reli-
ance upon it. If such a misrepresentation induces 
the insurer to assume a risk which otherwise it 
would not have taken, at least not at the premium 
charged, there is a legal ground of avoidance and 
actual fraud need not be establshed since it is not 
a material factor in the avoidance of the contract 
under such circumstances. * * *" 
What is true as to the original policy is also true as 
to the renewal. As is said on page 426 of the same vol-
ume: 
"The general holding is that in the absence of 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a new application or anything showing a different 
intention, the renewal of a fire insurance policy 
is impliedly made on the basis that statements 
in the original .application or policy are still ac-
curate and operative." 
The ease of Eklund v. Metropolit1an Life Iwsuranc.e 
Co., 89 Utah 273, 57 Pac. (2d) 362, involved an action 
on an industrial life policy. In her application for insur-
ance the plaintiff had stated that she had not been under 
the care of any physician within three years which was 
not true. The court held the policy to be void and said: 
"In the applications for insurance, as hereto-
fore set out, the assured stated that she had never 
been under treatment in any hospital; that she· 
had not been under the care of any physician with-
in three years; she declared that these statements 
were true and complete and that any misrepresen-
tations would render the policy void. These state-
ments were false. Her application for the first 
p·olicy was made N ovemher 2, 1933, less than a 
month after the last day she had been treated by 
Dr. Quick. The application for the second policy 
was made the 31st of January, 1934, two days 
after the assured had been treated by Dr. Tauffer 
at the Salt Lake General Hospital. These state-
ments which the assured made were material to 
the risk. The policies were issued without physi-
cal examination of the assured. Whether the com-
pany would issue the policies was dependent upon 
the answers of the assured. The utmost good faith 
to answer truthfully was required of her. On the 
assumptions that the statements in the applica-
tions were true, the policies were issued. By mak-
ing the false rep-resentations, which the assured 
did, the comp~any was misled to its prejudice. 
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Whether we class the statements made by the 
assured as representations or warranties, the 
same result is reached so far as the facts of this 
case are concerned. If a representation is material 
to a risk and likewise knowingly false, it will be 
as potent for rescission of the contract embodied 
in the policy as if the untrue statement was made 
in form of a warranty (Numerous cases cited)." 
Another point which the defendant attempts to raise 
by the evidence in this case is that the defendant, al-
though he· was not the owner of the property, held the 
property for John M. Hardy, and therefore should be en-
titled to recover. While persons who hold property for 
other persons might have a right to recover under such 
a policy, a full disclosure of their interest is required. 
"The holder of the naked legal title to prop-
erty, who has no beneficial interest therein, has 
been held not to be the sole and unconditional 
owner within the meaning of a policy provision. 
It has also been stated that property held in trust 
or on commission must be insured as such or the 
policy would be void. In applying such rules, the 
courts have denied recovery to an agent for an un-
disclosed principal, where the policy provided the 
insured had sole and unconditional ownership. 
The same result has followed where principal 
ownership is in the ward of insured. Thus, a suit 
brought by the insured as trustee for his children, 
alleging he held the property in trust for them, 
has been held to have been properly dismissed. 
''Property held in trust by the insured for a 
church congregation is not owned by such insured 
in compliance with such a policy requirement. And 
where the insured, upon receiving the property, 
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had given a written agreement to reconvey the 
property if indemnified for certain liabilities for 
which the property had been given as security, 
his interest is that of trustee or creditor, which 
must be specifically disclosed, where the policy 
so provides. On the other hand, a grantor who has 
conveyed such prop·erty in trust to pay debts to a 
third p·erson has no such title as will enable him 
to recover. 
"It has been held that where the plaintiff 
takes title to certain lots in trust for himself and 
others, with the agreement that he is to manage 
and sell the p·roperty and divide the proceeds, he 
is not the sole owner of the lots. The same is true 
where one holds property in trust for herself and 
her sister." Vol. 4 Insurance Law and Practioe, 
Applem.run, pages 323-4. 
Nor should we lose sight of the insured's misrepre-
sentation as to the equipment being free from any en-
cumbrances as such a misrepresentation has the same ef-
fect as a misrepresentation as to the ownership. of the 
frame dwelling. As is said in Volume 4, Insurwnce Law· 
and Practio.e, A pplem,an, page 377 : 
"A provision in a policy that the insurer shall 
not' be liable if the property is encumbered is rea-
sonable and valid rendering the contract void up-
on the violation of such condition. The insurer 
has a right to stand on the terms of the policy and 
refuse to pay any loss occurring. 
"'The existence of a mortgage upon the in-
sured property is generally considered material 
to the risk, particularly if considered a warranty. 
The hazard is considered to have been increased, 
particularly if the insurer in accordance with the 
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usual conduct of its business, would not have is-
sued the policy had it lmown of the encumbrance. 
Michigan stated bluntly that the existence of any 
substantial encumbrance on property is a material 
fact whether the statements of the insured are 
made warranties or not. Missouri stated even 
more flatly that it makes no difference whether 
the concealment was material to the· risk. T·ennes-
see, however, has considered the failure to disclose 
a lien or mortgage, is not a circumstance material 
to the risk and will not avoid the policy. 
"The acceptance by the insured of a policy 
containing such a restriction as to encumbrances 
is binding upon him, as he is considered to be 
charged with knowledge of such condition. If 
there is a definite and positive misrepresentation, 
there is little question as to the result. Even 
where no p·ositive representation is made how-
ever, this result might still be followed. * * *" 
The policy in this case contained the provision: 
"This entire policy shall be void if, whether 
before or after a loss, the insured has wilfully 
concealed or misrepresented any material fact or 
circumstance concerning this insurance or the 
subject thereof, or the interest of the insured 
therein, or in case of any fraud or false swear-
ing by the insured relating thereto." 
It also contained the following provision: 
"The insured shall give immediate written 
notice to this company of any loss * * * and with-
in sixty days after the loss * * *, the insured shall 
render to this company a proof of loss, signed and 
sworn to by insured, stating the knowledge and 
belief of the insured as to the following: The time 
and origin of the loss, the interest of the insured, 
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and of all others in the property, the actual cash 
value of each item, etc." 
There is no question that the insured has been guilty 
of misstating his interest or concealing the interest of 
others in the property which is the subject of this insur-
ance. Moreover he has attempted to recover $2,000 for a 
building on which he himself placed a value of $1,000. 
Nor can there be any question that the ownership 
of the building or other representations which were made 
were material to the risk. There has been no attempt to 
deny that the misrep,resentations were made and the only 
evidence offered has been an attempt to explain why. 
Such 'being the case, the entire contract should be held 
to be void and the plaintiff to be entitled to recover the 
$2,000 paid under the, policy. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN VACATING ITS 
ORDER FOR A NEW TRIAL ON PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
The judgment on the special verdict in this-case was 
entered on April 13, 1954. On that same date an order 
was entered giving notice to the plaintiff that the court 
would grant the new trial unless the plaintiff consented 
on -or before Ap-ril 23, 1954, that the judgment on the 
counterclaim should be reduced by $1,000 (R. 72-3). The 
consent not having been filed on April23rd, an order was 
entered granting a new trial (R. 76). 
On September 28, 1954, the court gave notice that 
he intended to enter an order vacating the order for a 
new trial, and on October 13, 1954, six months after the 
entry of the original judgment in this action, the court 
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
entered .an order vacating the order for a new trial and 
amending the findings. 
Rule 59 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Prooedure, 
which confers upon the court the power to grant a new 
trial of its own motion, which was done in this case, pro-
vides: 
"Not later than ten days after the entry of 
judgment the court of its own initiative may order 
a new trial for any reason which it might have 
granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in 
the order shall specify the grounds therefor." 
Thus it is seen that the court may not enter an order 
for a new trial upon expiration of more than ten days 
after the entry of the judgment. Rule 6 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in certain in-
stances the court may extend the time in which certain 
action may be taken, but expressly provides: 
''But it may not extend the time for taking 
any action under Rules * * * 59 (b), (d), and (e) 
* * * except to the extent that under the condi-
tions stated in them." 
Provisions of these rules were adopted from the Fed-
eral Rules of Procedure and the specific provisions in-
volved herein are the same. As to the power of the court 
to grant a motion for a new trial after the ten day period, 
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 
3, page 241, have this to say: 
"The ten day limit cannot be enlarged under 
Rule 6 regarding enlargement of time. It applies 
·as well to new trials granted on the initiative of 
the court under subdivision (d) of this rule. The 
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trial court may not of its own initiative grant a 
new trial after the ten day limitation has expired. 
If an appeal has been perfected to the court of 
appeals, the subsequent filing of a motion for a 
new trial is not timely." 
Nor can the court's jurisdiction be extended by the 
filing of any motion by the plaintiff: 
"The seasonable serving of a motion for new 
trial did not operate to extend the ten day limit 
within which trial court grant new trial on its own 
initiative, and hence granted new trail could not be 
sustained where motion itself was insufficient, 
merely because court stated, as additional grounds 
for granting new trial, that court was not satisfied 
with the verdict. Marshal's U.S. Auto Supply v. 
Cashman, C.C.A. lOth, 1940, 111 F·ed. (2d) 140, 
certiorari denied 61 ·s. Ct. 26, 311 U.S. 667, 85 L. 
Ed. 428. 
"Where ground of inadequacy of damages 
had not been assigned in any of plaintiff's motions 
but trial judge stated in his opinion damages were 
inadequate and for that reason amended motion 
for new trial was granted only as to the amount 
of damages, the judge acted in initiative of court 
within subdivision (d) of this rule and not on mo-
tion under subdivisions (a), ('b) thereof, so that an 
order granting a new trial which was not made 
within ten days after entry of judgment was not 
timely. F·reid v. McGrath, 1942, 133 F·ed. (2d) 350, 
76 U.S. Ap·p. D.C. 388, mandate recalled 135 Fed. 
(2d) 833, 77 U.S .. Ap·p. D.C. 385. 
"The time limitation with resp·ect to making 
of motions for new trial, applies as well to new 
trials granted on the court's initiative, even 
though a motion for a new trial has already been 
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seasonably filed on other grounds, l\icDonalds v. 
Dykes, D.C. Pa. 1947, 6 F.R.D. 569." 
Of course, if the court does not have any jurisdiction 
to enter an order granting a new trial upon the expiration 
of ten days after the entry of judgment, then the court 
does not have any jurisdiction to modify its order grant-
ing a new trial after the ~xpiration of that period, or to 
set such an order aside. A case particularly in point, 
which arose prior to the enactment of the new Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, but which deals specifically with the 
power of the court to modify or vacate its order grant-
ing a new trial is Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 Pac. 
1023. In that case, the facts are as follows : ·On the 25th 
day of September, 1908, the plaintiff filed in the District 
Court a written notice of motion for new trial. The mo-
tion was heard and submitted on the 17th day of October, 
and on the 28th day of that month, was overruled. On 
the 19th day of December, the plaintiff petitioned the 
court to grant a rehearing and reargument of plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial. On the 21st day of D·ecember, 
defendant filed a motion to strike plaintiff's petition 
for want of jurisdiction. The motion to strike was denied 
and on the 26th day of December, the petition was sub-
mitted, and on the 3rd day of Jline, 1909, was also denied. 
The question was whether or not the petition for rehear-
ing suspended the finality of the judgment. The court 
had this to say : 
"But the plaintiff urges that the· finality of 
the judgment was suspended by the subsequent 
filing of his motion or petition for a rehearing, 
and until the overruling of it on the 3rd day of 
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June, 1909, we think the District Court had not 
the po,ver to entertain such a motion. It is un-
known to our practice. In California where the 
p-ractice relat.ing to new trials is similar to ours, 
it has been firmly established that the court has 
no power to reopen the question of granting or 
denying a motion for a new trial after disposing 
of it. (Holtum v. Greif, 144 Cal. 521, 78 Pac. 11; 
Carpenter v. Superior Court, 7:5 Cal. 596, 19 Pac. 
17 4; Egan v. Egan, 90 Cal. 15, 27 Pac. 22; Lang 
v. Superior ·Court, 71 Cal. 491, 12 Pac. 306, 416; 
Coombs v. Hibberd, 43 Cal. 152). In the first case 
the court said : 
" 'The question, then, is as to th-e power of 
the trial court to vacate an order granting or 
denying a new trial after it has once been regu-
larly made and entered. The decisions of this 
court are numerous and uniform to the effect that 
a judgment or order once regularly entered can 
be reviewed and set aside only in the modes pre-
scribed by statute. If they have been entered pre-
maturely, or by inadvertence, they may be set 
aside on the p-roper showing (Cases cited), and, 
if the order as entered is not the order as made, 
the minutes may be corrected so as to make them 
speak the truth (Cases cited); but subject to these 
exceptions, the order is reviewable only on ap-
p·ela, -and, the decision of the trial court having 
once been made after regular submission of the 
motion, its power is exhausted. * * * It is f11JYl(Jtus 
officio.' 
''In the second case it was said: 'The function 
of this rule is that the modes in which a decision 
may be reviewed or prescribed by statute, and the 
courts are not at liberty to substitute other modes 
in their place. * * *' 
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"In the next place, the power of the District 
Court to rehear and reexamine the cause was once 
invoked by plaintiff's first application for retrial. 
After the application was denied, to then also per-
mit her petition to rehear and reexamine the order 
denying the motion is in effect to allow the limit 
of time within which a motion for a new trial may 
'be made to be enlarged and to render the proceed-
ings after judgment interminable. There must be 
some point where litigation in the lower court 
terminates, and the losing party turned over to 
the appellate court for redress (Coombs v. Hib-
berd, supra).* * *" 
The court gave as its authority for setting aside the 
order for a new trial, Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This rule provides among other grounds 
that a final order of judgment may be set aside for mis-
take, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. 
It is submitted that the mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise or excusable neglect referred to is that of the nature 
set out in Luke v. Colemar~A, where the order entered does 
not actually represent the order of the court and has been 
prematurely entered or entered due to inadvertence or 
mistake. However, the court having determined to grant 
a new trial on one date, cannot thereafter come along six 
months later and vacate its order granting a new trial. 
Such a procedure would only encourage the losing party 
to harass the trial court after the determination of a 
matter to the exent that the court finally in desperation 
or otherwise reverses itself. Litigation must end some-
where, and in this case it should have ended with the 
granting of a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to an application representing the defend-
ant, Leland Thompson, to be the owner of the property 
free from any encumbrances, the plaintiff issued its 
policy of insurance insuring the defendant against loss 
by fire to a frame dwelling, an Allis Chalmers tractor, 
and an Allis Chalmers combine. On November 8, 1952., a 
fire occurred in which the ~bove described prop;erty was 
damaged or destroyed. Upon p,resentation of a proof 
of loss by the defendant representing the defendant to 
be the owner of the frame dwelling and that the same 
was of value of $2,000, the plaintiff paid to the defendant 
the sum of $2,000. 
Subsequent to the loss and the payment of the $2,000, 
the plaintiff discovered that the defendant was not the 
owner of the frame dwelling at the time of the loss, but 
that the same had been sold to John M. Hardy on Decem-
ber 18, 1951. An action was brought to recover the $2,-
000, and upon the trial of that action, it was further dis-
covered that the frame dwelling was not owned by the 
defendant at the time the application for insurance was 
made, but was leased from the Box Elder County F'arm 
Labor Association, and that the Allis Chalmers tractor 
was not free from encumbrances but there had been a 
loan on the tractor at the time, neither of which situations 
had been revealed to the plaintiff. At the time of the trial 
it also develop,ed from evidence procured from the de-
fendant's own witnesses that the frame dwelling did not 
have a value of $2,000, but that its actual value was $1,-
000. The case was submitted to the jury upon a special 
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
verdict, and as a result of that verdict, judgment was 
entered upon the defendant's counterclaim for the dam-
ages to the tractor and combine and a judgment of no 
cause of action was entered on plaintiff's complaint. 
The court found as a matter of law that the verdict was 
excessive by $1,000, this being the amount the defendant 
had been overpaid on the value of the building and order-
ed a new trial on plaintiff's complaint provided the de-
fendant did not consent to reduce the judgment by that 
amount. Upon refusal of the defendant to accept that 
amount, the court ordered a new trial on plaintiff's com-
plaint. Six months later the court set aside this order 
and the finding that the verdict was excessive and rein-
state·d the original judgment. 
The misrepresentations made by the defendant as to 
the ownership of the property and any encumbrances 
thereon were material to the risk, and by reason of the 
same, the policy was void, which leads us to the con-
clusion under the authorities cited in this brief that de-
fendant was not entitled to recover anything by his coun-
terclaim, that the judgment on that counterclaim should 
be set aside and another judgment entered that plaintiff 
should recover back from defendant $2,000 paid under the 
policy. 
The plaintiff is entitled to the return of its $2,000 
for another reason, namely, that when the defendant 
sold his entire interest in the building, his interest in the 
building ceased and he no longer had an insurable inter-
est under the p·olicy of insurance, which was vital to his 
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recovery. If we are to ~assume that the policy was not 
voided by the misrepresentations and that the defendant 
did have an insurable interest in the frame building, the 
fact still remains that the limit of his recovery was the 
$1,000 actual value of the building, the same being the 
price for which he sold the building, which the buyer 
was willing to p,ay for the same. This issued was raised 
by the pleadings, and a finding by the court on this issue 
was proper, especially in view of the liberal policy an-
nounced by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
state that issues not raised by the pleadings, which are 
tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
by the pleadings. 
The trial court recognized this and granted a new 
trial to the plaintiff upon its complaint, providing that 
the defendant would not consent to a reduction of the 
judgment by the $1,000, which in his opinion the plaintiff 
was entitled to recover. The defendant not consenting, 
the new trial was ordered, only to be set aside by the 
court six months later, which action we resp,ectfully 
submit was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 1and 
Appellant 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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